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ABSTRACT. Small and medium sized firms play an impor-
tant role in the process of creative destruction. The focus of
the paper is on the international diffusion of small and medium
sized firms innovations. Small and medium sized firms face
two challenges in globalization: property rights protection and
barriers to entry. We suggest that these barriers can frequently
be circumvented by using existing multinationals as interna-
tional conduits for small and medium size firms’ innovations.
However, such intermediated modes of expansion is adversely
affected by transaction difficulties and intermediator’s rent
extraction. We raise two categories of questions: (i) is the
private sector systematically making the wrong choice
between the direct and intermediated mode of international
expansion? and (ii) What should be the policy guidelines to
improve the overall rate of international diffusion of innova-
tion by small and medium sized enterprises.
1.  Introduction
Most of the giant corporations that dominate the
landscape of the emerging global economy began
as small businesses.1 In many cases, the rise of
these companies was due to their founders devel-
oping radical new skills, knowledge, and infor-
mation. Henry Ford made the automobile an
affordable consumer good with his use of
assembly line production. William Boeing applied
military technology to civilian aircraft production.
John D. Rockefeller built a worldwide distribution
system. Bill Gates created a standard computer
operating system. 
In the early decades of the twentieth century,
Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1942) wrote of the
process of creative destruction, whereby the
continual creation of new ideas by innovative
firms steadily destroys the positions of stagnant
firms. This process, or one much like it, is now
thought by many mainstream economists to be
fundamental to the prosperity of a capitalist
economy. The continued ability of upstart com-
panies to challenge industry leaders is thus of
critical public policy concern. There are two key
factors in the economic environment that gain
importance: property rights and barriers to entry.
The employees of large firms are part of a team.
Any innovation belongs to the firm, or at best to
the team. This diffusion of property rights, along
with bureaucratic inertia and other problems
characteristic of large firms, dampen potential
innovators’ incentives to be creative. Thus, we
argue that smaller firms are better at creating
radical innovations because they better protect the
innovator’s property rights (National Academy of
Engineering, 1995).
Small and medium size firms, however, have
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only very limited operations abroad. One reason
for this is barriers to entry. These can be natural:
financial market imperfections, differences in legal
systems, cultures and languages can make inter-
national business ventures risky for small and
medium size firms. Barriers to entry that limit
international expansion are systematically higher
for smaller firms than for larger firms. 
We suggest that these barriers faced by SMEs
in international markets can frequently be cir-
cumvented by using existing multinationals as
international conduits for international expansion.
Multinationals can be catalysts and facilitators of
smaller firms’ international expansion. While the
direct mode of expansion by small firms is the
subject of much discussion, the intermediated
possibility has not been given much attention. We
compare the two modes of international expan-
sion, direct and intermediated, and identify the
conditions for private market arrangements to be
efficient. 
In the next section, we outline the importance
of small and medium size firms for economic
growth. In the third section, we discuss small and
medium size firms’ patterns of internationaliza-
tion, and propose some economic explanations.
In the fourth section, we discuss the role of inter-
mediated expansion via large multinational firms.
Section five contains the policy implications, and
the final section summarizes the paper. 
2. The importance of small and medium size 
firms to economic growth 
Mainstream economists increasingly accept that
the fundamental force behind sustained improve-
ment in the standard of living of market economies
is creative destruction, as described by
Schumpeter (1934). In the process of creative
destruction, the continual emergence of “creative”
new ideas underlies the sustained growth of
capitalist economies. The ongoing “destruction”
of firms that fail to innovate is the less attractive,
but essential, aspect of economic growth (Acs and
Audretsch, 1991; and Audretsch, 1995). 
2.1. Creative destruction and smaller firms
Schumpeter argued that innovations give firms
temporary monopolies: until someone else dupli-
cates or betters their innovation, they have no
competitors on the same playing field. Since
developing, producing, and marketing products
based on new ideas is costly, Schumpeter felt
these temporary monopolies to be essential: they
generate funds to finance further innovation.
Because large firms are most able to develop and
retain expertise in these areas, and thus reap
maximum returns on their temporary monopolies,
Schumpeter (1942) saw innovation as increasingly
an activity of very large companies. He feared that
the increasing bureaucratization of big companies,
which was becoming evident even in his time,
might eventually choke innovative effort in large
firms and lead to macroeconomic stagnation. 
In fact, in the modern economy, innovation
remains largely the work of smaller firms. In a
study of previously stagnant industries, Acs and
Audretsch (1988) find the correlation of patents
with rate of product and production innovation to
be quit low among larger firms, but to be much
higher among smaller firms.2 In short, larger firms
are less successful innovators. The same study also
finds that industries in which large firms appear
more dominant have higher levels of innovative
activities, but these innovative activities mostly
occur in smaller firms in those industries.3 That is,
smaller firms are the innovators in more innova-
tive industries.4
2.2. Property rights
The critical role of property rights in maintaining
the prosperity of capitalist economies is becoming
increasingly evident, especially as more informa-
tion about why economic growth in socialist
countries, and the many third world countries that
imitated them, was so low.5 People must be able
to keep a reasonable portion of the fruits of their
labors or they will not work. 
Society must protect innovators’ property rights
to the gains from their innovations. The creation
and application of new knowledge are fundamen-
tally the work of human beings. An innovator in
a large company often has only very limited
property rights in her innovation. The new
product, process, etc. generally belongs to the
firm, not the employee who invented it. Even in
organizations that share profits with their
employees, creative employees must share the
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returns to their innovative effort with many other
employees, even when their names are distinctly
associated with an innovation.6 This reduces
creative employees’ incentives to work hard for
the company.
The lack of clear property rights in large
corporations creates perverse incentives for both
employees and managers. Both can benefit from
“free riding” on other people’s innovative efforts
and results. If someone else in the company
devises a new product, everyone benefits; so
everyone sits back and wishes their colleagues
good luck. Furthermore, the job security, bureau-
cratic promotion process, and incentives to
conform that characterize careers in a large
company may dull incentives to be truly creative.
Employees and managers may turn their creative
efforts towards the extraction of resources from
the corporation rather than socially useful inno-
vation. 
The suboptimal incentive structures in many
large corporations can allow bureaucratic inertia
to drive corporate decisions. Managers and
employees’ interest lie in protecting their claims
on the firm’s cashflows. Thus, when firms try to
overcome the “free rider” problem by assigning
bonuses only to those employees directly involved
in an innovation, this may actually stifle more
radical initiatives. This is because senior
employees and managers, who were involved in
past innovations, may push for refinement to those
older ideas (which generate income for them),
rather than more radical innovations (which
reward only younger innovators). This might take
the form of directing corporate resources towards
“ideas with proven track records” or “lower risk”.
Indeed, if radical new ideas threaten the values
of the older innovations, senior people in the firm
actually have a monetary incentive to stifle the
new ideas! Even where innovations merely require
substantial adaptive effort from older employees,
pressures to retard change may result. These
pressures may manifest themselves as bureaucratic
delays, funding problems, or administrative road-
blocks. Thus, large corporations may pay inade-
quate attention to radically new ideas.
These problems may be especially intractable
in large publicly-held firms, where managers’
interests align least with value maximization.
Cockburn and Henderson (1995) report privately
held pharmaceuticals firms (presumably with
managers under greater pressure to maximize
profits) to have more linkages with public sector
research organizations than publicly-held phar-
maceuticals firms have. They find such linkages
to be strongly associated with innovative success.
They also find privately-held firms to adopt better
innovation development procedures more quickly.
In contrast to innovative employees in large
firms, where the legal and economic systems
permit it, independent innovators can hold clear
property rights, can have every incentive to under-
take radical innovations, and can be largely free
of red tape. Thus, smaller firms serve as better
vehicles for innovation.
2.3. Barriers to entry
Why then, are large firms so important in modern
economies? We believe there are a number of
barriers to entry, both natural and deliberate, that
frequently prevent new upstart firms from gaining
market share. Acs and Audretsch (1988) show that
a high concentration ratio has a greater negative
impact on small firm innovation than on large firm
innovation.7 If concentration ratio is related to
entry barriers, as many economists believe, we can
infer that in industries with higher entry barriers,
smaller firms become less innovative. We now
examine several forms these barriers might take. 
Financing problems
Smaller firms must be able to grow quickly to
apply innovations to large scale production. Ready
access to capital seems of critical public policy
concern here. As Schumpeter recognized,
economic growth is dependent on a sophisticated
financial system. People with money but no ideas
and people with ideas but no money must be
brought together. This is what financial markets
and institutions do. King and Levine (1993) show
that developing countries with more advanced
financial systems have faster economic growth, all
else equal. This finding is consistent with the view
that poor access to capital can stymie the expan-
sion of innovative small firms, to the detriment
of the economy as a whole.8
It is arguable that large corporations remain
important in modern industrial economies because
of the formidable resources they can direct at
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innovation, and the speed with which they can
undertake the large scale exploitation of innova-
tions. These advantages essentially stem from
access to capital, and perhaps can compensate in
many ways for the poor property rights protection
large firms offer innovators.
Much of the modern literature in this area stems
from Diamond (1985, 1989, 1991), and empha-
sizes the information collection and processing
functions of banks, and the idea of creditors’
reputations. According to Diamond banks invest
in acquiring information about creditors, while
creditors acquire reputations as credit-worthy.
Because acquiring information and establishing
reputations are both costly and subject to various
moral hazard and adverse selection problems,
small firms have imperfect access to capital. 
Venture capitalists step into this information
gap to act as intermediaries between large
investors who lack information and independent
innovators who lack capital. However, they
usually demand roles in management decisions,
and still require insiders to put up substantial
funds.9 Thus, insiders’ wealth constrains such
firms’ growth. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a, 1994b) present empir-
ical evidence supporting this view. 
This limits the size of the physical operations
innovators can establish, and the number of people
with administrative, operations, and marketing
expertise they can hire. Thus, their imperfect
access to capital may force new, innovative firms
to begin with very small scale production. This, in
turn, limits the profits their innovations generate.
In contrast, large firms can readily use internal
capital reserves or raise funds on financial
markets. Thus, a large multinational can begin
marketing an innovation around the world almost
immediately. This lets larger firms earn higher
returns than smaller firms on similar innovations.
Imperfect information
Many barriers to entry are ultimately due to new
entrants’ information disadvantages or others’
poor information about the new entrant.10 Poor
information about labor, raw materials or output
market conditions can lead new entrants to make
costly mistakes. New market entrants also may
find it difficult to attract good workers and support
firms because employment and contracts with
established firms, especially larger ones, are seen
as less risky. 
However, steady entry might erode these infor-
mational barriers. Later entrants can learn from the
mistakes of early entrants. Also, a higher steady
flow of entrants reduces suppliers’ and workers’
dependence on established firms and thus their
resistance to switch jobs and business partners. In
other words, more frequent new market entry
reduces information based entry barriers.
Entry barriers erected by entrenched firms
Other entry barriers are erected by established
firms, resolved to maintain their profits by deter-
ring prospective new competitors. A popular view
of such barriers among economists is of estab-
lished firms colluding to overcharge customers
and build up war chests, which they then can use
to finance predatory pricing to drive away new
competitors. 
A sensible antitrust regime can work to limit
this sort of behavior, but a complete elimination
of market power is neither feasible nor desirable.
After all, a critical feature of the process of
creative destruction is that innovators should
benefit from short-term monopolies due to their
innovations.11
Entry barriers erected by government
Perhaps the highest and most economically
damaging entry barriers are those erected by gov-
ernments. Government regulations and restric-
tions, legal logistics, taxes, and also corruption
increase the costs of establishing a new firm.
Baumol (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1993),
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that
artificial barriers to entry encourage innovative
people to invest in exploiting the system, rather
than in socially useful innovation. 
Government organized barriers to entry in
developed countries are usually more subtle.
Restrictions on entry into “culturally sensitive”
industries like broadcasting and magazines are on
the books in Canada. Lenway, Morck and Yeung
(1996) present evidence that U.S. government
protection keeps inefficient old firms afloat and
can reduce innovative firms payoff and thus
interest to enter. In the United States, trade barriers
against wood products, agricultural goods, auto-
mobiles, and many other imports act as barriers
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to foreign entrants. In many countries, inspection
procedures, safety standards, environmental stan-
dards, and other seemingly worthwhile bureau-
cratic practices may mask barriers to entry that
really serve to protect politically entrenched
special interests. 
The ubiquitous nature of government created
barriers to entry throughout the developed and
developing world is undeniable. Larger firms may
find government created entry barriers easier to
overcome than do small firms or independent
innovators. Large firms have more resources,
contact and clout. They can afford delays, lawyers,
bribes, and campaign contributions. 
Property rights, entry barriers, and innovation
The elimination of entry barriers and the protec-
tion of property rights creates a fertile environ-
ment for Schumpeterian innovation (Thurik,
1996). Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that
economies with a high proportion of smaller firms
are often more dynamic. In Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and other parts of South East Asia, entry barriers
appear to be low, and small and medium size
firms’ entry rates and market shares are both high.
These regions’ economic growth is well above the
global average. The rapid growth of South Korea
in the 1980’s was accompanied by an increasing
market share for small and medium size firms,
probably a consequence of the elimination of
credit rationing policies that favored large firms
(Nugent, 1994). 
China’s recent rapid growth is also linked to the
emergence of many new small firms in village
townships and in coastal areas, often in new indus-
tries. The economies of the eastern bloc under
socialism, in contrast, relied on gigantic state-
owned enterprises. Even without the perverse
incentives of socialism, it is arguable that such
gigantic enterprises were incapable of maintaining
a pace of innovation to match that set by creative
destruction in the West. Recently, after painful
efforts to liberalize their economies, some Eastern
bloc countries are beginning to grow, and simul-
taneously to depend more heavily on small and
medium size firms.12
In summary, for the global economy the
fundamental driving force behind rising living
standards is the ability to innovate. Radical inno-
vations are more likely to take place in small firms
than large firms because of the advantages that
small firms offer in protecting property rights.
Refinement and full fledged commercialization of
innovations are more likely to take place in larger
firms because of the availability of resources. High
rates of innovation therefore require property
rights protection and low barriers to entry. 
3. International expansion by small and 
medium size firms 
Given that smaller firms are important initiators
of innovation, the internationalization of these
firms would represent a global diffusion of inno-
vation. In this section, we first describe some
empirical observations about the international
expansion of smaller firms, and then discuss some
theoretical explanation for them. Our basic point
is that barriers to entry that limit international
expansion are systematically higher for smaller
firms than for larger firms (Fujita, 1995). What
follows is evidence that this is so, and explana-
tions for why it is so. 
3.1. Smaller firms are homebodies
A way to quantify smaller firms’ multinational
operations relative to those of large firms is to ask
whether the formers’ share of foreign direct
investment exceeds their market share in their
home economies. The United Nations’ report on
“Small and Medium-sized Transnational Corpora-
tions” (1993) suggests that, among developed
countries with high outward foreign direct invest-
ment activities, small and medium size firms
conduct disproportionately less outward foreign
direct investment. For example small and medium
size firms in 1982 employed 33.5% of U.S.
workers in the manufacturing sector. However,
small and medium sized firms accounted for only
1.1% of all employment by U.S. owned foreign
affiliates in that sector. 
In the U.S., small and medium size firms
accounted for about 98% of all business estab-
lishments in 1982, but they accounted for only
about 20% of all multinational firms in 1988. In
the U.S., roughly 35% of large publicly traded
firms are multinationals (Morck and Yeung, 1991).
Assuming this to be the proportion of all large
firms that are multinationals, simple arithmetic
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reveals less than 0.2% of small and medium size
firms to have multinational operations! The same
pattern occurs in Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.13 Moreover, what little interna-
tional investment small and medium size firms do
undertake is a recent phenomenon. According to
the U.N. report, about two-thirds of foreign direct
investment by small and medium sized firms
occurred after 1980.14
Exporting is an initial step towards international
expansion. Small and medium size firms’ share
of exports is also disproportionately lower than
their share of home economy sales. However, the
disparity here is less dramatic than for foreign
direct investment. For example, in Italy, small and
medium size firms’ share of home economy sales
is 49%, and their share of exports is 45%, which
is only marginally less. However in Japan, the
export share is about 12.9% while their share of
home economy sales is 61.4%.15
Finally, international expansions by smaller
firms are more likely to fail. Newbound et al.
(1978), show slightly better performance from
larger firms. Evans et al. (1991) and others
confirm this finding. Based on inward foreign
direct investment made in the U.S. in 1987,
Shaver, Mitchell and Yeung (1995) show that
the survival probability of foreign subsidiaries in
the U.S. is higher when the parent is publicly
traded. Larger firms are more likely to be publicly
traded. 
3.2. Why do smaller firms stay at home?
If, as we have argued, smaller firms can be
vehicles for innovation, their strong links to their
home economies would seem to be economically
suboptimal. Why are small firms generally home-
bodies? There are two caveats that must be kept
in mind in interpreting the above numbers, and
then two broad classes of reasons. We first
consider the caveats. 
Caveat (i): Only some small firms are innovators
The most important small and medium size firms
are those that carry radical innovations; however,
these need not be the majority of smaller firms.
Many smaller firms undertake no innovative
activity. Some may be serving local niche markets
relying on owner’s control. Some simply have no
competitive advantage to justify international
expansion. Others are unable to expand without
the owner losing control. Still other small firms
might be unsuccessful innovators. The fact that
overseas expansion is not a general characteristic
of smaller firms does not mean that those smaller
firms that would benefit from it are unable to
expand abroad. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that what
foreign direct investment smaller firms undertake
does come from firms that look like
Schumpeterian innovators. Smaller firms that
expand abroad are more profitable than those that
do not. The former report profit to sales ratios of
7.9% in 1990, while the latter report only 4.2%.
Smaller multinational firms also invest more in
innovation; the U.N. Report (1993) points out that
“in contrast to small and medium sized firms in
general, not only do transnational small and
medium sized firms conduct more R&D, but they
produce more patented products.”16 Also, smaller
firms with foreign affiliates have larger domestic
market share, 30% of the market in their primary
product, and their affiliates hold 38% of their
markets. These large market shares and high R&D
spending rates are consistent with smaller multi-
nationals having innovative “edges”.
Caveat (ii): The numbers may be misleading
Small and medium size firms’ disproportionately
low share of foreign direct investment might be
exaggerated. A multinational firm’s operation is,
by nature, greater in scale and scope. As a small
firm builds up its foreign operation, it presumably
quickly attains a size that qualifies it to be
classified as a large firm.17 Indeed, Vernon’s
(1966) product life cycle theory posits that the
diffusion of new products takes time. Information
about a new product may reach domestic con-
sumers first, causing domestic growth to precede
international growth. Thus, a dearth of small firms
among multinationals does not mean small firms
will not expand abroad. 
Despite these caveats, smaller firms may well
be less likely to move into foreign markets than
larger firms. There are two broad classes of
reasons for this. 
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(i) Barriers to entry in foreign expansions are 
probably higher for smaller firms
Each of the barriers to entry we discussed in
section II that limit the scope for expansion of
smaller firms is probably an even greater obstruc-
tion when international expansion is contemplated.
The same shortcomings of financial institutions
and markets that we argued might prevent innov-
ative small firms from growing rapidly would
present even greater barriers to foreign expansion.
If a small U.S. company cannot get a bank loan
to expand domestically, it is unlikely locating the
collateral abroad would improve the firm’s cred-
itworthiness. Moreover, if a country’s banks will
not lend to a small domestic firm, it is unlikely
foreign banks would. Consistent with this, among
firms with foreign operations, small and medium
size firms tend to have partially owned foreign
affiliates while large firms have fully-owned
affiliates. Only 47% of smaller firms’ foreign
affiliates are wholly owned, compared to 53% for
large firms.18 Also, 26% of small and medium size
firms’ foreign expansions take the form of joint
ventures, versus 17% for large firms. Nevertheless,
they are consistent with capital constraints dis-
proportionately affecting smaller multinationals. 
If lack of information about how labor, input,
and product markets work is a barrier to domestic
expansion, as we argued above, it is a blockade
against foreign expansion. Organizing production
and marketing in foreign countries is even harder
than doing so domestically for a new firm. The
entering firm has to work with a new legal system,
bureaucratic regime, and set of social customs. It
must hire and manage a labor force accustomed to
the local economy. It must send out expatriate
managers and experts. Evans et al. (1991) find that
initial foreign expansions are often thwarted by
sub-optimal management. Simply put, mangers
inexperienced in foreign direct investment may not
have necessary knowledge to be efficient interna-
tional operators. 
As we argued above, larger firms have inherent
advantages in overcoming artificial barriers to
entry. They can afford more delays, lawyers,
campaign contributions and other bribes. De Soto
(1989) and others argue that artificial entry
barriers, especially those maximally impregnable
barriers due to government, are more pervasive
in developing countries. Smaller multinationals do
indeed concentrate their foreign direct investment
in developed countries, although this could also
be consistent with their having less information
about more exotic countries.19
(ii) Many foreign markets offer poor protected 
for property rights 
The key advantage smaller firms have over larger
firms as vehicles for innovation is the better pro-
tection of innovators’ property rights the former
offer. Perversely, this importance of property
rights over innovations may be critical in limiting
small innovative firms’ overseas expansion.
Shlieifer and Vishny (1993), DeSoto (1989) and
others argue that poorly protected property rights
are a pervasive problem in many developing coun-
tries. This is especially true for property rights
over intangible assets like patents, trademarks,
etc.20
A firm that expands into a country which offers
no real recourse against the theft of such assets,
risks setting up competitors that otherwise would
not be viable. Yet these intangible assets are
precisely the things that might make international
expansion desirable in the first place for the small
firms that own them. Since property rights are
least protected in developing countries, this might
also explain the preference of small multinationals
for operations in other developed economies. 
In contrast, the sorts of intangibles larger multi-
nationals might bring, things like managerial,
production, or marketing expertise, may be harder
to steal, rendering international expansion by
larger firms relatively more attractive. Also, large
firms might have more credibility in threatening
foreign governments and companies with retalia-
tion when their patents or trademarks are stolen. 
Therefore, the disadvantages that keep small
firms small in domestic markets are likely to have
similar or stronger effects in keeping them from
expanding abroad, and the key advantage of
smaller firms have as vehicles for innovation, their
better protection of innovators’ property rights,
becomes less clear cut when foreign expansion
might put those property rights at risk in under-
developed or corrupt legal systems.21
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4. Intermediated expansion via larger 
multinational enterprise
In principle, one might imagine small start up
firms creating new ideas and then slowly devel-
oping into large, capital rich firms as they market
their products on a steadily larger scale. This is
the thrust of the corporate life cycle outlined by
Jovanovic (1982). Modern global economy of the
1990s’, however, leads us to a new course; there
is now a “symbiotic” relationship between small
and large firms in the creative destruction process.
Global competition makes larger firms pay
closer attention to innovations available with a
view towards buying or applying them. Large
firms often rely heavily on support groups of
suppliers and other vertically related alliances. For
example, the competitiveness of big automobile
manufacturers depends critically on the efficiency
of their parts suppliers. The success of many high-
tech firms depends on a large pool of independent
scientists and freelance software writers. In many
ways, large multinationals compete on the strength
of their supporting casts as much on their own
strengths (Gomes-Casseres, 1996).
The implication is that large multinational firms
often serve as international conduits for the inno-
vations of smaller firms.22 Global competition
induces multinationals to source from the most
efficient suppliers worldwide. When multina-
tionals purchase an input from an innovative
supplier in one country for use through its inter-
national operations, they are essentially applying
that supplier’s innovation worldwide. Yet, the
supplier need not expand abroad directly. Indirect
international diffusion of this sort makes innova-
tive suppliers more profitable. Because of the
greater scale and scope of multinational firms’
global markets, the small innovative support forms
can earn greater returns, and they do not even have
to spend resources to overcome barriers against
international expansion themselves! The existence
of successful multinational firms therefore encour-
ages innovation by smaller firms. Aitken, Hanson,
and Harrison (1994) present evidence that multi-
national firms do in fact induce more exports by
smaller firms.
Moreover, industries that are vertically related
to multinationals compete internationally even
though they have no direct investment or even
sales abroad; the competition takes place as the
multinationals compete. Direct international
competition between supporting industries in dif-
ferent countries is not necessary to bring about
efficiency improvements. Chung, Mitchell, and
Yeung (1994) show that U.S. automobile parts
makers became more productive as competition
between U.S. Japanese auto assemblers increased.
They argue that heightened international compe-
tition downstream increased the penalties on
“unfit” suppliers, and they either improve or did
not survive.
The sort of intermediary role for multinationals
need not be confined to vertically related sup-
pliers. Independent smaller firms with a new final
product might find using multinational firms as
intermediary agent in global marketing more effi-
cient than breaking into foreign markets directly.
Multinational firms have existing networks of
global affiliates and established marketing skills.
Distributing the innovation internationally via a
multinational firm means giving that firm a cut,
and so reduced the ultimate return from foreign
sales, yet it calls for very little investment in
building up foreign organizational and distribution
infrastructure. Highly innovative garment pro-
ducers and footwear producers in the Far East got
rich this way. In the process, they displaced many
less efficient producers in North America and else-
where.23
Sometimes, the greatest synergy might be
achieved through continual mergers of new small
firms with innovative products into large firms
with international market access. Thus, highly
innovative small pharmaceutical companies are
continuously absorbed into larger multinationals
as the industry is forced to become more efficient.
Williamson (1975, pp. 205–206, emphasis added)
has also emphasized the inherent tension between
hierarchical bureaucratic organizations and entre-
preneurial activity. He concluded:
“I am to regard the early stage innovative disabilities of
large size as serious and propose the following hypothesis:
An efficient procedure by which to introduce new products
is for the initial development and market testing to be
performed by independent inventors and small firms
(perhaps new entrants) in an industry, the successful 
development then to be acquired, possibly through
licensing or merger, for subsequent marketing by a larger
multidivision enterprise.”24
14 Zoltan J. Acs et al.
Larger firms thus act as catalysts, or facilitator,
allowing smaller firms to expand internationally
by proxy. Indeed, given the list of reasons for
small innovative firms to forego foreign expan-
sion, indirect access to foreign markets via multi-
national might well be the efficient choice. Small
firms need not expand internationally themselves
for the world economy to benefit fully from their
innovations. They need only supply multina-
tionals, which then serve as the intermediator of
the international diffusion of small firms’ inno-
vation.
There are two drawbacks in the intermediated
modes of foreign expansion. First, there are trans-
action difficulties. Innovations are often informa-
tion based. Transactions of innovations will face
the usual agency problem and the information
asymmetry problem (“market for lemon problem”).
Also, the small firm has to be concerned that its
transaction partner, the large multinational firm,
will hijack its innovation. Moreover, commercial-
izing an innovation involves investing in specific
assets. The small innovating firm may be con-
cerned that the multinational firm extracts ex post
its rightful earnings by hold-up means.
Transaction problems are mitigated by
designing mutually incentive compatible contracts.
A government can reduce transaction difficulties
by establishing and enforcing a transparent and
reliable contractual regime. For example, by
raising the punishment on legal contractual viola-
tions, a government makes commitment to legal
contract more credible and thus makes legal
contracts a more useful tool to formulate incen-
tives compatible contracts.
Another drawback in the intermediated modes
of international expansion is that large multina-
tional firms may have bargaining power over small
innovative firms. For instance, if a single large
multinational is the monopoly supplier of access
to world markets for smaller firms in a given
country, region or industry, it could extract
monopoly rents and inhibit innovation. A large
number of competing multinationals would insure
that indirect access to foreign markets for smaller
firms is efficiently priced. This consideration
suggests that we need open competition both
globally and in the home country (Morck and
Yeung, 1995).
5.  Policy implications
We have argued above that many small and
medium size firms are initiators of Schumpeterian
innovations. The optimum rate of, international
diffusion of these innovations enhances global
welfare.
Small and medium size firms’ observed low
rate of direct international expansion often leads
to suggestions about giving them special policy
help.25 We urge caution. First, as we have pointed
out in Section III, the observed home-boundedness
of small and medium size firms may be exagger-
ated due to data definition. Also, many small
and medium size firms are local niche players
undertaking no innovation activities. Policy
favoritism towards them should be for the re-
distribution objective, with little obvious help
towards efficiency improvement.
Second, as we have argued in Section IV, the
internationalization of small and medium size
firms’ innovations can be intermediated by large
multinationals, not just via direct international
expansion by small and medium size firms. With
its presence, there is no presumption that there is
too little international diffusion of small and
medium size firms’ innovation, even when direct
international expansion by small and medium size
firms is truly taking place at an extraordinarily low
rate.
Still, the policy assumption that there is too
little international diffusion of small and medium
size firms’ innovation appears plausible, particu-
larly in consideration of the formidable entry
barriers we mentioned in Section II. While we
shall proceed with the assumption, we emphasize
that the fundamental question whether we have
too little or too much creative destruction is
unresolved, a point we address in our concluding
section.
Accepting the current policy assumption, we
raise two categories of policy questions: (i) Is the
private sector systematically making the wrong
choice between the direct and intermediated mode
of international expansion? If so, what needs to be
done? (ii) What should be the policy guidelines
to improve the overall rate of international diffu-
sion by SMEs innovation?
There are three sets of costs fundamental to the
choice between the direct and the intermediated
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mode of international expansion. The first set of
costs is associated with entry barriers and protec-
tion of property rights. In the direct mode, smaller
firms must each build up an organizational and
tangible asset infrastructure to support inter-
national operations. As well, they must each
separately pay the costs of becoming efficient
operators in global markets. All these costs stem
from the need to overcome entry barriers and to
protect property rights. In the intermediated mode,
there will be savings on the above costs because
multinational firms already have established their
international network and are more able to protect
property rights. In other words, in direct interna-
tional expansion, the expanding small and medium
size firm incurs some socially redundant invest-
ment.
The second set of costs is the transactions costs
incurred in the intermediated mode of international
expansion. We have mentioned in the previous
section that in the intermediated mode of foreign
expansion, there are transaction difficulties
between a small and medium size firm and its
intermediator. To counter transaction difficulties,
the transaction partners must spend resources to
develop an incentive compatible contract and
spend resources to make the contract credible, e.g.
making credible pre-commitments and spending
on monitoring. These are non-trivial costs. Also,
the second best nature of incentive compatible
contracts, as a resolution to transaction difficul-
ties, implies that the value created in intermedi-
ated foreign expansion may be less, ceteris
paribus, than that created in direct foreign expan-
sion.
The third cost arises when the intermediator has
market power in serving to internationally diffuse
the small and medium size firm’s innovation. The
intermediator then will extract rents from the small
firm; this cost is a transfer from the small firm to
the intermediating multinational.
Assume that a small firm develops an innova-
tion that would have value in international
markets. In the direct mode of international expan-
sion, the cost of going overseas, from the social
perspective, is the small firm’s investment in the
market entry and property rights protection. In the
intermediated mode, again from the social per-
spective, the cost is the large firm’s investment in
the market entry and property rights protection and
the dead-weight loss due to transaction difficulties
between the large and the small firm. Hence, the
optimal social choice between the two modes of
international expansion depends on the savings in
the market entry costs and property rights protec-
tion costs in the intermediated mode and the
dead-weight transaction cost incurred in the same
mode. When the former exceeds the latter, the
intermediated mode of international expansion
should be chosen over the direct mode.
In making its private choice, the small and
medium size firm will opt for the intermediated
mode if the associated savings in market entry
costs and property right protection costs exceeds
the dead-weight transaction costs and the rent
extraction by the intermediating large firm. The
small firm’s maximum receipt from the interme-
diating large firm is the potential value of the
innovation on international markets minus the
large firm’s spending on market entry and property
rights protection and the deadweight loss transac-
tion costs. The actual receipt is the difference
minus further the rents extracted by the interme-
diating large firm. The difference between the
small firm’s earnings in intermediated and direct
international expansion then is equal to the savings
on market entry and protection of property rights
minus the dead-weight transactions costs and the
rents extracted by the intermediating firm.
Hence, the private choice between the two
modes of international expansion is socially effi-
cient as long as rent extraction by the intermedi-
ating firm in the intermediated mode is zero. If
rent extract by the intermediator is non-trivial, the
private market will choose direct international
expansion more often than it should, leading to too
much redundant investment in market entry and
protection of property rights. The above reveals
that the first and foremost policy guidelines should
be to mitigate rent extraction and to resist policies
in favor of helping small and medium size firms
to expand internationally.
The policy concern should go beyond just
correcting potentially wrong private market choice
between the direct and the intermediated modes of
international expansion. If the rate of creative
destruction is indeed too low, public policies
should also aim to increase the creation and inter-
national diffusion of innovations by small firms.
The above analyses suggest that policies should
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aim to reduce the costs in international expansion.
That is, policies should aim to reduce private
market costs incurred for the protection of
property rights, to reduce entry barriers, and to
reduce transaction costs.
The analysis also suggests that policy subsides
to help small and medium size firms to expand
overseas will lead to excess direct international
expansion. Such policy measures reduce the small
firm’s market entry and protection of property
rights costs. They thus reduce the beneficial
savings in market entry and property rights pro-
tection costs when intermediated international
expansion is chosen over direct international
expansion. As a consequence, direct international
expansion is chosen too often, leading to excess
redundant investment in market entry and property
rights protection undertaken via small firms.
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that small firms are
indeed the engines of global economic growth.
Creative destruction plays an important role in the
process of economic growth. Small firms play a
crucial role in the process of creative destruction
because the diffusion of property rights, along
with bureaucratic inertia and other problems
characteristic of large firms, dampen potential
innovator’s incentives to be creative. Thus, we
argue that smaller firms are better at creating
radical innovations because they better protect the
innovator’s property rights.
The continued ability of upstart companies to
challenge industry leaders is a critical public
policy issue However, there has been a lack of
solid public policy analysis on the subject of
public policy towards small firms. A theme of this
paper has been the relative advantage of direct
versus intermediated international expansion by
small and medium size firms. We raise several
conceptual considerations important in comparing
the two modes of international expansion. 
What is at the disposal of policy-makers is the
ability to either increase or reduce the speed of
creative destruction and therefore the rate of
economic growth through creative public policy.
Those policies include as we have suggested: the
elimination of as many barriers to entry as
possible; protecting innovator’s property rights;
maintaining an efficient institutional environment
to mitigate transaction costs; open domestic
markets to multinationals. 
The role of government can be stated simply.
Government policies that weaken property rights
or strengthen barriers to entry slow the process of
creative destruction. Government policies that
strengthen property rights or lower entry barriers
speed it up.
What is the socially optimal rate of creative
destruction? Is more innovation always better?
Ready access to global markets increases the
returns to innovation and therefore the incentive
to innovate. Rapid innovation, in turn, leads to
further globalization as firms seek greater
economies of scale on which to apply their inno-
vations. This positive feedback spiral is the motive
force behind the emerging global economy. 
An increased rate of innovation is good in that
it reduces production costs and/or increases
consumer choice. These societal gains stem from
the “creative” side of creative destruction. More
rapid innovation is bad in that it can make existing
physical and human capital obsolete. In doing this
it can disrupt careers and communities. These
societal costs stem from the “destructive” side of
creative destruction. 
No well-accepted theory of a socially optimal
rate of creative destruction currently exists. Many
economists writing about the increased pace of
innovation and the rise of the global economy
immediately assume more innovation is socially
good. This view is presumably shared by firms
that lobby for R&D subsidies and by the branches
of government that grant them. While this view
may well be right, it is important to recognize that
there is no compelling economic theory backing
this up. 
The decision as to the optimal rate of creative
destruction is essentially political. The policy
recommendations we make above would enhance
the positive feedback spiral of increasing innova-
tion and globalization. If this is viewed as socially
undesirable, the recommendations above should
instead be viewed as proscriptions. 
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Notes
1 For a review of the literature on small firms see Acs (1995,
1996) and Storey (1994).
2 Acs and Audretsch (1988), p. 683. Among large firms, the
correlation coefficient is 0.107; that among smaller firms is
twice as large. The measure of innovation activities is the
number of innovations in each four-digit SIC industry recorded
in 1982. Innovation is defined as “a process that begins with
an invention, proceeds with the development of the inven-
tion, and results in the introduction of a new product, process,
or services to the market place.”
3 Acs and Audretsch (1988), p. 687.
4 This is true at least in those industries where information
asymetries create a divergence of opinion about the value of
new knowledge. If the information is undervalued agents may
have to take it outside of the organization.
5 See Shleifer (1995). 
6 In some corporations, employees have to sign agreements
in which they surrender the property rights to their inventions
to the firm. 
7 Acs and Audretsch (1988), Table VII, p. 687.
8 At the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business
of the 60 public policy issues cited access to capital was the
one most frequently mentioned (U.S. Small Business
Administration , 1995). 
9 See Lerner (1994 and 1995). 
10 Capital market imperfections are a special case of this
more general information problem. Investors are unwilling to
buy into firms about which they know little.
11 Acs and Audretsch (1989) obtained empirical evidence
that concentration deters the entry of small firms, but appar-
ently does not impede the entry of larger firms.
12 “In a Polish Shipyard, Signals of Eastern Europe’s Revival
– Medium size companies are the engines of a region’s
growth”, New York Times, July 4th, 1995. See Loveman and
Johnson (1995). 
13 In Italy in 1982, small and medium size enterprises’
(sme’s) share of establishment is 96.9% and share of employ-
ment is 53.4%, but its share of multinational enterprises
(mne’s) is only 28.7% and its share of mnes’ foreign employ-
ment is only 7.4%, even in 1987. In Sweden, sme’s share of
establishment in 1988 is 97.5%, share of employment is
63.4%, while its share of mne establishment is 74% and its
share of mne foreign employment is merely 2%. In U.K.,
same’s share of establishment is 98.4% (in 1981) but its share
of mne establishment is only 25%. 
14 U.N. Report (1993), p. 53.
15 U.N. Report (1993), p. 21.
16 U.N. Report (1993), p. 97.
17 The U.N. definition of a large firm is above 500
employees in manufacturing, above 100 in wholesaling, and
above 50 employees in retailing and services. 
18 U.N. Report (1993), p. 83.
19 U.N. report, p. 51, Table III.1. 
20 SMEs are less likely to file for patents abroad than large
businesses across all technology areas. When only the highest-
value patents within each technology area are considered, a
smaller proportion of SMEs patents is still filed abroad in the
majority of technology areas. Small and large business patents
that are filed abroad, however, are quite similar in the number
of countries in which applications are filed. This suggests that
SMEs with valuable inventions face special barriers in
obtaining foreign patent protection because of limited
resources (Mogee, 1996).
21 Intellectual property protection was the most frequently
cited international policy recommendation at the 1995 White
House Conference on Small Business (U.S. Small Business
Administration, 1995)
22 Large multinational firms can also serve as conduits for
circumventing market fragmentation of various sorts. It is well
known that trade barriers stimulate foreign direct investment.
Canada’s “National Policy” of high tariffs early this century
exploited this to crete an economy of subsidiaries.
Multinational firms can also by-pass capital market controls
and other restrictions.
23 Foreign direct investment appears to augment home and
host country productivity, and this appears to be due to both
technology diffusion and increased competitive pressure. See
Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; Blomstrom, 1986; Caves, 1974;
and Chung, Mitchell and Yeung, 1994.
24 Many large multidivisional firms are also multinational.
25 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development Program
on Transnational Corporations – Small and Medium Sized
Transnational Corporations: Role, Impact and Policy
Implications, 1993.
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